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A PRIMER OF PRACTICAL EVIDENCE
CiALES ALAN WRiGMT
Last May the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
-Hennepin County Bar Association' sponsored an Institute on Prac-
tical Evidence. A distinguished panel of experienced Minnesota
attorneys and judges discussed practical aspects of certain questions
about evidence. The moderator was the Hon. Gunnar H. Nordbye,
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota. The panel included: Arthur B. Geer, Esq., a Minne-
apolis attorney who has tried many cases for defendants; Hon.
Gustavus Loevinger, formerly Judge of Ramsey County District
Court; Lee Loevinger, Esq., a Minneapolis attorney and frequent
contributor to legal periodicals; Prof. David W. Louisell, of the
University of Minnesota Law School; Hon. Harry H. Peterson,
formerly Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court; and
the present writer.
The wealth of experience which the members of the panel have
had in the field of evidence made their answers uniquely valuable,
and suggested the desirability of making these answers available
in permanent form. Unfortunately no complete transcript of the
proceedings was made. But with the thought that it might be useful
to law students and young lawyers who have not yet often been
in court, I have undertaken to set out here many of the questions
which were discussed at that Institute, and to give rather brief an-
swers with citations to a few leading cases and to secondary authori-
ties which contain leads to other decisions. My answers are of
course based in large measure on the answers given by my col-
*Member of the Minnesota Bar. Visiting Associate Professor of Law,
University of Texas Law School. [Two points about the footnotes deserve
mention. 1. I have occasionally cited cases in which I have been among the
attorneys. Because my reading of these cases may not be entirely objective,
though I have striven to make it so, I have noted my association with tho
case in the footnote in order to provide fair warning to the reader. 2. The
footnotes give some hint of the great extent to which I have relied on the
magnificent treatise on evidence by my colleague, Prof. Charles T. McCor-
mick. But even the footnotes fail to show my indebtedness to Professor Mc-
Cormick for, his wise counsel and generous encouragement in my attempt to
master the law of this fascinating subject-C.A.W.]
1. The Committee was under the able co-chairmanship of Judge Leslie L
Anderson and George P. Hoke, Esq.
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leagues on the panel, as I have been able to reconstruct these from
my own notes and from the fragmentary transcript. But I present
these answers on my own responsibility, and have not hesitated to
follow my own view in the few instances where it differed from that
of others on the panel.
I. LEADING QUESTIONS-THEIR USE AND MISUSE
1. When are leading questions proper? Discretionary? Objec-
tionable?
In theory it is always in the discretion of the trial judge whether
to allow a leading question.2 But by rule a party is now given a right
to ask leading questions of unwilling or hostile witnesses and of an
opposing party, or his employee, called for adverse examination,,
and it is well settled that leading questions are usually proper on
cross-examination of the opponent's witnesses.4 Generally leading
questions will be allowed as to preliminary matters or questions not
substantially in dispute, and they frequently will be permitted to
children and other witnesses of limited understanding, and to a
witness whose memory has been "exhausted" but who is believed
to know additional material facts.'
Stated conversely, a question is properly objected to as leading
where it will suggest to the witness the answer to a question on one
of the main issues of the case. Nor is the question made unobjection-
able by putting it in the supposedly neutral form, "State whether or
not... ," since such a form still indicates to the witness the answer
desired.6
2. Suppose a question is properly objected to as leading. Must
the examiner drop the subject? Or can he put the question in a non-
leading form even though the witness, who has heard the question in
the form objected to, will now know what to answer?
It is almost always proper to put the question again in non-
leading form7 although the discretion of the court would seem
broad enough to require the examiner to come back to it later or
even drop it altogether. The sanction here is an ethical one. It is
unethical deliberately to ask a leading question, knowing it will be
objected to, in order to coach a witness for a non-leading question.,
2. McCormick, Evidence 10 (1954).
3. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.02; Wright's Minnesota Rules 261-62 (1954).
4. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 773 (3d ed. 1940).
5. McCormick, Evidence 11 n. 2 (1954).
6. State v. Murphy, 216 S. C. 44, 56 S. E. 2d 736 (1949) ; McCormick,
Evidence 9-10 (1954).
7. Allen v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 72 Conn. 693, 45 Atli. 955 (1900).
8. Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Assn., Canon 22:
Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods 43-4 (1954).
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3. Can I ask the court to instruct the jury that leading questions
are proper on cross-examination?
Such an instruction would be proper, and may be highly de-
sirable in order to cure any impression the jury may have that the
cross-examiner is putting words in the witness' mouth.
II. HEARsAY-WaAT Is IT AND How To GET IT IN
4. What is a verbal act?
The hearsay rule prohibits admission of out-of-court statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.0 Not all statements
made out of court.are hearsay. Some such statements are of im-
portance, not to prove the truth of what they say, but merely to
prove that the statement itself was made, where this is an operative
fact. The simplest example is an action for slander, where witnesses
may testify as to hearing the slanderous words. The utterance of
the words is itself an operative fact in the lawsuit.
The leading Minnesota case on the "verbal act" doctrine is
Hanson v. Johnson.1 0 In that case the issue was whether a tenant
had apportioned a particular portion of his crop to his landlord.
Evidence was held admissible that the tenant had pointed to the pile
of corn in question and said, "Here is your share, this belongs to
you.'. The court held that three acts combined to make the corn the
property of the landlord: husking the corn and putting it in separate
cribs; telling the landlord which was his share; and the landlord's
acquiescence in the division. The verbal statement was admitted as
being one of the operative acts."1
5. A body is found, believed to be that of Jones, and his widow
sues to collect his insurance. The insurance company believes Jones
is not dead and that the claim is a fraud. Shortly before the timw the
body was found Jones wrote a letter saying he was leaving on a trip
to a certain destination. The body was found at the place named in
the letter as Jones' destination. Is the letter admissible?
A reasonably well-understood exception to the hearsay rule
allows statements, otherwise hearsay, which are offered to show
9. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63; McCormick, Evidence § 2-5
(1954).
10. 161 Minn. 229, 201 N. W. 322 (1924). See also Patterson-Stocking,
Inc. v. Dunn Bros. Storage Warehouses, Inc., 201 Minn. 308, 276 N. W. 737
(1937) ; State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. W. 225 (1930).
11. Tracy, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 223 (1952), argues that
this is not a "verbal act" at all, saying that the act of pointing to the crib
had nothing equivocal about it, and the statement did not aid in giving legal
significance to the act but merely stated a past transaction. But McCormick
describes the Hanson case in detail as "illustrating the principle" of the
"verbal act." McCormick, Evidence 464 (1954).
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the declarant's then existing state of mind.12 From this the addi-
tional step has been taken of permitting admission of such state-
ments in order to support the inference that an intent shown by the
state of mind was subsequently carried out."" The facts in the prob-
lem are a simplification of those in the famous case of Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillnon,'4 where a letter similar to that described in the
problem was held admissible as supporting the inference that the
letter writer went to the place he had intended to visit, and thus
that the body was his. Justice Cardozo has described the ruling in
the Hillmon case as "the high'-water line beyond which courts have
been unwilling to go."' 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
has not been reluctant about going at least as far as the high water
line. In a prosecution for first-degree murder the court held admis-
sible a statement of the victim, made to a friend a few hours before
the slaying, that she had an engagement that night with the de-
fendant.'" The court referred to the statement as a "verbal act," but
present day analysis would deem it rather a declaration of intention
admissible to show that the intention was carried out.
6. What is res gestae?
Judge Nordbye remarked at the Institute on Practical Evidence
that "definitions of res gestae are as numerous as prescriptions for
the cure of rheumatism and generally about as useful."'" It would be
feckless to venture a definition here. This doctrine, if doctrine it be,
is the subject of a 200 page annotation in American Law Reports18
and of an unusually able analysis in this Review.'" The mouth-
filling Latin term has been used as justification for admitting state-
ments which are now seen to fall within four different exceptions to
the hearsay rule: (1) declarations of present bodily conditions ;20
12. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(12) (a).
13. McCormick, Evidence § 270 (1954).
14. 145 U. S. 285 (1892). For an exhaustive discussion, see Payne The
Hillman Case ... An Old Problem Revisited, 41 Va. L. Rev. 1011 (1959).
15. Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 105 (1933).
16. State v. Heyward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N. W. 63 (1895).
17. Compare Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Ad-
missible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L. J. 229 (1922) : "The marvelous capacity
of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion
of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology nrc
nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility
of evidence as 'res gestae.' It is probable that this troublesome expression
owes its existence and persistence in our law of evidence tp an inclination ofjudges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and pre-
cise thinking."
18. Anno., 163 A. L. R. 15 (1946).
19. Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1938).
20. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(12); McCormick, Evidence
§§265-67 (1954).
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(2) declarations of present mental states;21 (3) excited utter-
ances ;22 and (4) declarations of present sense impressions.2
The tendency is surely toward broadening of these exceptions.
In a Minnesota case which has attracted much attention, an un-
excited statement 45 minutes after the event by the victim of a fall
was held admissible in what the court called "a liberal interpreta-
tion of the res gestae rule."2 '
7- Is a statement by someone not a party to the case, which
would otherwise be excluded as hearsay, admissible on the ground
that it is an admission against interest?
The question contains a very common error in terminology
which obscures clear thinking. Use of the phrase, "admissions
against interest," confuses two separate exceptions to the hearsay
rule. 5 The admissions of a party and his privies are admissible
against him without more, even though he is available as a witness
and even though they may not-but usually will be-against his
interest ;26 statements of a person who is not a party, or privy to a
party, may be admitted as declarations against interest only when
the declarant is not available at the trial and the statement was
against his interest when it was made.27
The leading Minnesota case in point contains dicta, frequently
since repeated, that declarations against interest are admissible only
where the declarant is dead and the statement was against his
pecuniary interest. 28 But the trend is to view more liberally the con-
ditions on admissibility of declarations against interest. Thus the
Uniform Rules of Evidence would not require that the decfarant be
dead, but would accept his unavailability for any reason, and would
allow the 9tatement if it would have subjected dedarant to civil
or criminal liability or risked making him an object of hatred,
ridicule or social disapproval in the community.?9 In an interesting
21. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(12) (a); McCormick, Evidence
§§ 268-71 (1954).
22. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(4) (b) ; McCormick, Evidence
§ 272 (1954).
23. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (4) (a); McCormick, Evidence
§273 (1954)..
24. Jacobs v. Village of Buhl, 199 Min. 572, 583, 273 N. IV. 245, 250
(1937). As to whether the rule there laid down is applicable to all actions or
only to workmen's compensation proceedings, see DeParcq, The Uniform
Rides of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 301, 3434 (1956).
25. McCormick, Evidence 504-5 (1954).
26. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(7)-(9); McCormick, Evidence§§ 239-252 (1954).
27. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(10); McCormick, Evidence
§§239-52 (1954).
28. Halvorson v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 'Minn. 18, 21, 91 N. WN.
28, 29 (1902).
29. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(10).
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Minnesota case, a mother was prosecuted for manslaughter for
throwing into the stove the new-born baby of her unmarried
daughter. A majority of the court found insufficient proof that the
baby had been born alive, and thus reversed the conviction, though
they discussed no evidence questions.30 A persuasive dissent would
have emphasized a statement out of court by the daughter which
indicated the baby had been alive. This statement would not have
met the test of the old Minnesota dicta, but would have met the
test of the proposed Uniform Rule. The daughter, though alive, re-
fused on fifth amendment grounds to answer questions about the
incident, and thus was "unavailable." And since she was in fact
herself convicted for concealing the birth of a child, her statement
at the time it was made would have subjected her to criminal lia-
bility, as well as incurring the risk of "social disapproval in the com-
munity."
There do not seem to be any Minnesota holdings, as contrasted
with dicta, that declarant must have been dead and the statement
against his pecuniary interest, and the court itself has said that
the latter requirement is contrary to modern thinking.,1
S. Can public opinion polls be used as evidence or would they
be excluded as hearsayf If they are admissible at all, is it necessary
to call the persons who actually asked the questions of the public, or
is it enough to call the person who directed the making of the poll?
Use, or attempted use, of public opinion polls as evidence is a
very recent development in the law, and doctrine has not yet fully
crystallized. This technique can be helpful in a wide variety of cases.
It can be used in a trademark action to show confusion or lack of
confusion in the public mind, in an anti-trust case to show where
the patrons of certain businesses come from, in a misbranding case
to show the impression the public has as to the properties of the
product, or in a criminal case to show whether there is prejudice
in the community which will prevent a fair trial. Doubtless new
uses of polls as evidence will be developed in the future.
Probably the results of such polls, when properly conducted,
would be held admissible today, although there is no agreement as
to the theory on which they are admitted. Some courts and writers
have thought that these are not hearsay at all, since the answers of
the persons interviewed are not being offered to prove the truth
of the answer but merely that such an answer was given, a sort of
30. State v. Voges, 197 Minn. 85, 266 N. W. 265 (1936).
31. In re Forsythe's Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 312, 22 N. W. 2d 19, 25
(1946).
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verbal act. 2 Others have contended that these polls may be admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule, either as a declaration of a
present state of mind33 or by analogy to the exception for trade
reports.34 In a non-jury case in the local federal court, Judge Bell
relied on such poll results without feeling it necessary to consider
the hearsay question. 35
It seems to be usual to call the interviewers themselves to testify
as to the results they obtained.36 But where a really large survey
has been made, even this can be impractible, and the lawyer may
wish to put on the stand only the person who directed the survey.
This would raise a further question of hearsay, because the super-
visor would be testifying as to things he was told by the interviewers
who worked under, him. I have found no decisions on the propriety
of such proof. A possible way to bring it in would be to qualify the
supervisor as an expert, have him testify as to the care with which
he chose his interviewers, instructed them in their work, and checked
the end product to make sure that the results were scientifically re-
liable and valid in the light of the recognized principles applicable in
this field. After laying this foundation, it might then be proper to ask
for his expert opinion as to the state of public feeling on the par-
ticular question:
"Opinion testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or
partly on information, oral or documentary, recited by him as
gathered from others, which is trustworthy and which is prac-
tically unobtainable by any other means, is competent even
though the firsthand sources from which the information came
be not produced in court."37
Where the poll is being used in a criminal case on a motion for
change of venue because of local prejudice,38 hearsay problems will
be minimized since there is no requirement that the court on such
a motion consider only such evidence as would be admissible at the
trial of the case. Results of a poll in such situations have been pre-
32. E.g., United States v. 88 Cases, 187 F. 2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951);
Household Finance Corp. v. Federal Finance Corp., 105 F. Supp. 164 (D.
Ariz. 1952).
33. E.g., 37 Minn. L. Rev. 385 (1953). See Uniform Rules of Evidence,
Rule 63(12) (a).
34. E.g., McCormick, Evidence 620 n. 5 (1954). See Uniform Rules of
Evidence, Rule 63 (30).
35. United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn.
1953).
36. Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 498, 507 (1953). E.g., United States v. 88
Cases, 187 F. 2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951).
37. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 823
(S.D. N.Y. 1940).
38. See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 498, 508-10 (1953).
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sented by affidavit; but the court may hear oral testimony on a
motion 9 and on something as new and unfamiliar as opinion polls,
use of live witnesses might well be more satisfying and impressive
to the court.
There is no Minnesota decision on the problems here discussed,
but a hint that the court will allow use of this kind of evidence
may be found in Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co.40 In a decision
which goes to the verge of the law, workmen's compensation was
allowed for death of a man attacked by thugs after leaving his place
of employment, in the warehouse district of Minneapolis. A sociolog-
ical study which showed that area of Minneapolis to abound with
criminals was held admissible to prove that decedent's employment
in the area subjected him to a danger, and that it was this danger
which led to his death.
9. Where a witness is on the stand, and thus subject to cross-
examination, can he testify as to previous statements he has made on
the subject matter of the action?
The answer in Minnesota today is clearly "No." Our court has
held that if a statement would be hearsay from the lips of another
witness it is no less hearsay because the witness happens to be the
person who made the prior statement. If I have a witness on the
stand and I ask him, "How fast were you going?" and he says,
"Fifty miles an hour," there is is no hearsay problem. But suppose
I then introduce a letter he wrote ten days after the accident in
which he said he was going 50. The fact that he is both the witness
and the person who made the prior statement does not prevent that
earlier statement from being hearsay. The reasoning of Justice
Stone in the famous case of State v. Saporen41 is that the real
danger of hearsay is that it is not subject to cross-examination, and
that the opportunity to cross-examine, to be meaningful, must be
an opportunity to strike while the iron is hot, rather than months
later.
Scholars reject this view. As Professor Louisell aptly put it at
the Institute, "Wigmore would have laughed at that decision had
he lived to see it." And indeed Professor McCormick has persua-
sively rebutted point-by-point the argument stated by Justice
Stone.42 The Uniform Rules of Evidence are contrary to Minne-
sota law on this question, and would allow introduction as posi-
39. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05; Wright's Minnesota Rules 259 (1954).
40. 209 Minn. 596, 297 N. W. 19 (1941).
41. 205 Minn. 358, 285 N. W. 898 (1939).
42. McCormick, Evidence 80-81 (1954).
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five evidence of written statements made prior to the action by a
witness who is present and available for cross-examination. 43
III. D-AD MEN TELL No TAEs
10. When is conversation with a deceased person admissible as
of right.
The much criticized "Dead Man's Statute"" prohibits a party to
an action, or any person interested in its outcome, from testifying
concerning any conversation with a dead person relative to the
matter at issue in the case. Not any interest will disqualify the wit-
ness. Instead the interest must be legal, pecuniary, certain, direct,
and immediate, and not an uncertain, contingent, remote, or merely
possible interest 4 5 But a number of exceptions have been created to
the rule set out in thestatute. Thus it does not bar testimony: by the
spouse of the plaintiff in a personal injury action" or an action to
set aside a mortgage;' 7 or by an agent or servant of a party;" or
by a nominal party ;49 or by a party having no financial interest in
the outcome of the case such as a trustee,50 an administrator,5 ' or an
officer of a corporation. " Further the conversation is admissible if
it has been testified to at a prior trial by the deceased. 5
11. In application of the "Dead Man's Statute," is it tnaterial
that thw testimony of the witness who lid conversations with the
dead person, is adverse to the witness' own interests?
The "Dead Man's Statute" is the last remnant of the discredited
common-law rule that disqualified as a witness anyone interested in
43. Thus see Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1), approved by
DeParco, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View, 40 Minn. L
Rev. 301, 338-43 (1956). Of course the court would have to retain discretion
to exclude such statements where they would be prejudicial in effect, as in
giving extra, and improper, weight to identification testimony in a criminal
case merely by showing that the witness made a similar identification at some
earlier time. See Desmond, The Trowbridge Case: A Near Miscarriage of
Justice, 41 A. B. A. J. 209 (1955).
44. Minn. Stat § 595.04 (1953).
45. In re Arnt's Estate, 237 Minn. 245, 248-49, 54 N. NV. 2d, 333, 336(1952).
46. Johnson v. Whitney, 217 Minn. 468, 14 N. W. 2d 755 (1944).
47. Dale v. First Nat Bank, 178 Minm 452, 227 N. V. 501 (1929).(1929).
48. Boelie v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 224 Minn. 57, 74,28 N. XV. 2d 54,
64 (1947) ; State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. NV. 225 (1930) ; Darwin
v. Keigher, 45 Minn. 64, 47 N. W. 314 (1890).
49. Suter v. Page, 64 Minn. 444, 67 N. W. 67 (1896).
50. Salscheider v. Holes, 205 Minn. 459, 286 N. W. 347 (1939).
51. Exsted v. Exsted, 202 Minn. 521, 279 N. W. 554 (1938).
52. Sacred Heart Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minm. 331, 199 N. V. 81(1924).
53. Palon v. Great Northern R. R., 135 Minm. 154, 156. 160 N. NV.
670, 671 (1916) ; Myrick v. Purcell, 99 Minn. 457, 109 N. NV. 995 (1906).
19561
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the outcome of the litigation. The basis of this rule was the likeli-
hood of perjury. The "Dead Man's Statutes" were enacted, when
the general common-law disqualification was abolished, on the
theory that perjury is likely by an interested witness where the
person with whom he talked is not alive to expose the lie. But there
is hardly an incentive to lie in order to hurt one's own interests.
Thus the reason for the statute does not apply where the testimony
is adverse to the interest of the witness. On such an analysis as
this the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a scholarly opinion, has
refused to apply the statute to bar such testimony.5 4
12. May a party testify as to a conversation with a dead person
if his opponent has opened up the subject by cross-examination?
Yes. The rights given by the "Dead Man's Statute" are waivable.
If the court erroneously overrules an objection to testimony which
should have been barred by the statute, the objecting party does
not waive his rights by cross-examining on the same matters or
offering direct evidence to meet that erroneously admitted. But if
either on cross-examination or direct examination the adverse party
goes beyond the scope of the inquiry to which his objection was
properly made and as to which it should have been sustained, or
if on his own he brings up the subject, and introduces evidence
of other matters in regard to the conversation, he waives the benefit
of the statute and any erroneous rulings of the courts.
"In other words, when a litigant thus voluntarily opens the
door for the purpose of obtaining what he affirmatively desires,
he thereby waives the right given by the statute to exclude such
testimony and gives the interested party or witness the right to
further testify in his own behalf and fully explain such trans-
action or conversation." 55
13. What is the future of the "Dead Man's Statute?"
Our court has noted, correctly, that "most commentators con-
demn dead man statutes."5 6 Yet in the same case in which it made
that remark it gave a very strict reading to the statute, and indeed
announced that it would enforce the statute to the full extent in-
tended by the legislature. The Minnesota State Bar Association at
its 1955 convention endorsed a proposal to abolish the disqualifica-
tion of the "Dead Man's Statute" and leave it to the trier of fact,
whether court or jury, to determine the credibility to be given to
testimony of conversations with a dead person. The proposed
statute is highly desirable and its chances of enactment seem good.
54. Ehmke v. Hill, 236 Minn. 60, 51 N. W. 2d 811 (1952).
55. IN re Arnt's Estate, 237 Minn. 245, 250, 54 N. W. 2d 333, 337 (1952).
56. Pearson v. Bertelson, 69 N. W. 2d 621, 626 n. 5 (Minn. 1955).
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IV. DocuMENTs DoN'T LIE
14. When may the plaintiff introduce his hospital records? How
about his history, as given to an interne, or a nurse's report on' her
observations of plaintiffs actions? When may the defendant intro-
duce plaintiff's hospital records?
Admission of the hospital record depends on what it contains.
To The extent that the record shows facts it is admissible, but parts
of it which reflect opinions are not admissible; instead the person
who gave the opinion must be called as a witness and thus subjected
to cross-examination. The following parts of the record are routinely
admitted: nurse's notes taken during the progress of the patient's
care; charts reflecting temperature, blood pressure, and pulse
rate; and laboratory tests and records. But parts of the record which
contain interpretations of x-rays or opinions of the attending physi-
cian as to the cause and prognosis of the condition are not ad-
missible.57
Defendant may introduce all proper parts of the hospital record
except as the privilege objection may be made. Of course the
privilege may have been waived by requesting and obtaining a copy
of a report of a pre-trial physical examination made by the defend-
ant5 s or by introduction of evidence as to the physical condition. But
mere introduction of the non-privileged part of the hospital record,
such as nurse's notes and the like, would not waive the plaintiff's
privilege as to the parts of the record to which the privilege applies.
The real dynamite in a hospital record is the history of how the
condition developed. In personal injury cases the history frequently
will refer in some detail to the manner in which the accident oc-
curred that precipitated the hospitalization. Thus in a recent case
there was a sharp issue as to whether plaintiff had been thrown
from a streetcar as she was boarding it, or whether she fell while
running across the street to the car. The history in the hospital
record contained the statement: "Approx 3:45 PM 5/16/50 pt
entering rear door of Selby-Lake streetcar when door closed throw-
ing her to ground on to left side." The supreme court held it was
error to permit the plaintiff to introduce this history, laying down
the rule in unequivocal terms:
"We believe the better rule is that under M.S.A. c. 600 hospital
records and charts, properly identified, are admissible when not
privileged to prove diagnosis, treatment, or medical history of
the patient to the medical and surgical aspects of the case but
57. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 303-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1944). But see McCormick, Evidence 612-13 (1954).
58. Wright's Minnesota Rules 217-18 (1954).
1956]
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that hearsay and self-seiving statements contained therein are
not admissible to prove how an injury occurred, at least when
offered by the patient. Whether they are admissible for impeach-
ment purposes or for some other purpose not here involved we
need not now determine."
59
15. Is an accident report made by the driver of a bus to the bus
company admissible in evidence?
Though the decisions are subject to criticism, such a report has
been held not admissible under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act,6 0 even though it was made pursuant to an estab-
lished routine of the company."' The business of a bus company, so
it is said, is carrying passengers rather than maiming them.02 Under
proper circumstances the report may be used by an injured person
to impeach the defendant or regarded as an admission, or it may be
introduced by the defendant to show that its claims were not
recently fabricated. 63 If the report was prepared for some other pur-
pose in addition to preparation for litigation, it is subject to dis-
covery.64
16. Are income tax returns admissible to prove earningsf
It is quite clear that defendant can introduce plaintiff's tax re-
turns as admissions by plaintiff as to what his income was. 5 The
more difficult problem is whether plaintiff can introduce his own
,returns. There is no square holding on this point. In one recent
case plaintiff was allowed to introduce audits made in order to pre-
pare his returns, but the case turns partly on the fact that defendant,
having failed to object to such an audit for one year, could not object
to the audits for subsequent years.6 6 Also in that case plaintiff
wanted to use the audits to show that his income since the accident
was small.
I think that in the more usual case, where plaintiff offers returns
showing his income before his injury as proof of what he was
earning then, and thus how much his lost earning power is worth,
such returns should be admitted. This course is actually followed
59. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 26-27, 62 N, W. 2d
688, 696 (1954). Compare McCormick, Evidence 611 (1954).
60. Minn. Stat. §§ 600.1 et seq. (1953).
61. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 37, 62 N. W. 2d 688,
701-02 (1954).
62. Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 114 (1943).
63. Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922
(1924). Compare Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 20.
64. Wright's Minnesota Rules 169-70 (1954).
65. Wentz v. Guaranteed Sand & Gravel Co., 205 Minn. 611, 287 N. W.
113 (1939) ; Kregel v. Cirkler, 158 Minn. 175, 198 N. W. 664 (1924).
66. Dix v. Harris Machinery Co., 240 Minn. 218, 60 N. W. 2d 628(1933).
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in many cases, and is a convenient way of proving earnings. Further,
the returns are trustworthy since there is a complete absence of
motive on the part of plaintiff to overstate his income prior to the
injury, and thus pay more tax than is necessary. 7
Minnesota district courts have consistently held that a party's
income tax returns are subject to discovery. 8
17. In a case for property danmage to an autonobile, can I prove
the damage by asking the owner what the repair cost, bolstering
this with a receipted bill, or must I bring on a repairnan to testify
as to the "'reasonable cost?" Suppose that some of the damage hasn't
yet been repaired, but that the owner has had an estimate as to its
cost. Can he testify as to the amount of this statement?
It is necessary to distinguish between the measure of damage
and the evidence necessary to prove the damage. Normally the
measure of damage where an automobile has been damaged will be
the reasonable cost of restoring the car to its former condition. In
Minnesota the actual cost of repair is always admissible as tending
to show what the reasonable cost would be.'O Thus the plaintiff
can testify as to the amount he has paid and the receipted bill is
unnecessary.
The damage not yet-repaired poss quite a different problem.
There is no doubt of the plaintiff's right to collect for necessary re-
pairs even though he has not had the repairs made." But I doubt
if an estimate would be admissible to prove this anticipated cost. The
estimate would be merely the conclusion of the garageman who
made it, and would not be admissible unless he were present and
subject to cross-examination.
Of course in the usual case the most convenient course is for
counsel to stipulate as to the cost of repair.
18. How can I use the answers to interrogatories at the trial of a
case? May they be referred to in argument without having beens
introduced in evidence?
Written interrogatories may only be addressed to an adverse
party7l and thus are admissible in evidence at the instance of the
67. Cf. In re Lust, 186 Minn. 405, 412, 243 N. W. 443 446 (1932).
68. Wrighes Minnesota Rules 165-66 (1954). Federai cases are to the
same effect. E.g., Mullen v. Mullen, 14 F. R. D. 142 (D. Alaska 1953) ; Merri-
man v. Cities Service Gas Co.; 11 F. R. D. 584 (W.D. Mo. 1951) - Volk Y.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 14 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.41, Case 2 (D. Mim.
1950) ; Miller v. Steamer Sultana, 77 F. Supp. 287 (NV.D. N.Y. 1948).
69. Engholn v. Northland Transp. Co., 184 Minm. 349, 238 N. W\. 795(1931). See also Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 74 N. kV. 2d 305 (Mfinn.
1955), holding that the ovner of real or personal property may testify as to
its value.
70. Hanson v. Hall, 202 Min. 381, 279 N. W. 227 (1938).
71. Minn. R. Civ. P. 33; Wright's Minnesota Rules 203-05 (1954).
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interrogating party so far as the documents themselves go. 2 But
there may be other objections to their admission, such as that they
contain hearsay or opinion or are not the best evidence.73 Most
evidence problems will be obviated by the fact that, being by the
adverse party, the answers are admissions and not themselves ob-
jectionable as hearsay, although they may quote remarks of other
persons which would be hearsay. Because of the possible infirmity of
some answers to interrogatories, they should be read into evidence
or offered as exhibits, in order that objection may be made to por-
tions of the answers not properly admissible.
19. What sort of ,foundation do I need to make before I can
introduce photographs of plaintiff's injuries in a personal injury
case?
It is necessary to demonstrate that the photographs accurately
represent the injuries as of the time they were taken.7 4 Usually this
will be done most conveniently by having the attending physician
examine the photographs and so testify. The supreme court has
recently noted that
''caution must be exercised in admitting colored photographs
which may tend to exaggerate the seriousness and extent of
wounds or burns. Where such photographs give false impres-
sions of disability or of pain and suffering endured, the pre-
judicial effect might well outweigh their probative value. ' 75
20. Suppose that a document is still in existence but is -withoul
the jurisdiction of the court and not subject to control of either
party. How do I lay a foundation to introduce secondary evidence
as to its contents?
The witness should first be asked if he knows of the existence of
the document. Then he should be asked where the document is. Pre-
sumably he will testify that it is in another state. In many jurisdic-
tions that is the only showing required in order to introduce
secondary evidence of its contents. But in Minnesota it is necessary
to go further and prove that the proponent has made reasonable
efforts without avail to secure the original or that there are circum-
stances which show that such efforts would have been fruitless.',
Thus the witness should be asked what his relation is with the
person who has the document, and what efforts he has made to
have it turned over to him. After this showing the witness can be
72. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.04(2) ; Wright's Minnesota Rules 173-74 (1954).
73. 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2342-43 (2d ed. 1950).
74. Knox v. City of Granite Falls, 72 N. W. 2d 67, 72-73 (Minn. 1955).
75. Id. at 73.
76. Gasser v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 145 Minn. 205, 176 N. W. 484
(1920).
[Vol. 40:635
A PRIMER OF PRACTICAL EVIDENCE
asked if he knows the contents of the document, and when he says
"Yes," can be asked to relate these contents.
Of course if the document is within the state it is necessary to
show that a subpoena duces tecum has been served on the possessor
before secondary evidence will be admitted.--
21. An Iowa resident assigns a claim to a Minnesota resident by
a written assignment notarized by an Iowa notary. Is the assign-
-nent admissible without more? Will it be admissible if the assignee
can testify that he is familiar with the assignors handwriting, and
identifies the signature on the assignment?
If the document was identified by the assignee as stated in the
latter part of the question, it would be admissible with or without
the notary's seal. Indeed it seems probable that notarization or
acknowledgment of an assignment of this sort is unnecessary in
any event, and that the mere signature will be enough.78 Where a
notarial seal is required, and a foreign notary is used, the notary's
authority must be certified by the clerk of a court of record.--
22. We interviewed witnesses to an accident, and recorded our
interview on a tape recorder. Is the tape recording admissible
either as evidence or for impeachment or to refresh the inenzory of
the witnesses? Can the other side get the tape recording before trial
by discovery or is it protected by Rule 26.02?
A number of recent appellate decisions have laid down the rule
that tape recordings can .be played in court if they are properly
authenticated by a showing that they have not been edited and
that they are thus an actual recording of what the person said.8 0 The
recording is then regarded as the equivalent of a written statement
and is subject to the same rules of evidence as a written statement.
It cannot be used as substantive evidence unless it falls within one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. It can be used for purposes
of impeachment.
A tape recording should similarly be regarded as the equivalent
of a writing, and within the immunity from discovery created by
the final sentence of Rule 26.02.81
77. Schall v. Northland Motor Car Co., 123 Minn. 214, 143 N. V. 357(1913).
78. Minn. Stat. § 600.15 (1953).
79. Minn. Stat § 600.09 (1953).
80. The cases are collected in Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the
Courts, 40 Va. L. Rev. 23 (1954). That Minnesota will follow the lead of
other jurisdictions is indicated by recent dicta in which tape recordings were
analogized to written statements. See Price v. Grieger, 70 N. IV. 2d 421, 424
(Minn. 1955).
81. Rybak v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Minn. Dist. Ct, 2d Jud.
Dist., No. 280635 Dec. 23, 1953, quoted in extenso in Wright's Minnesota
Rules 166-68 (1954).
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23. Suppose a witness looks at a paper while on the stand. Can
opposing counsel examine the paper?
Anything inspected by a witness on the stand must be avail-
able for examination by adverse counsel, in order to protect the
adversary's right of cross examination. If the document is not
shown in full to adverse counsel then he can have the testimony of
the witness stricken just as if the witness had refused to submit to
cross-examination, even though the document is not offered in
evidence and even though the witness may have looked only at a
small part of a large document.
V. HOW TO MAKE A WITNEss LOOK BAD-TIE ART
OF IMPEACHMENT
24. Is the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness
being abandoned?
There are signs that it is. In a recent decision which has at-
tracted much attention, Judge Goodrich said that the rule is
"foolish," that it is not supported "in logic or common sense or
fairness," and that "all the modern writers in the law of evidence
speak to the same effect.""2 It does not apply to FELA death cases,
whether they are tried in state or in federal court.83 An old Minne-
sota case indicated somewhat cryptically that perhaps it has never
been the law in this state, 4 and it will clearly not be the law if the
Uniform Rules of Evidence are adopted. 5
25. Is there any real distinction between impeachment and posi-
tive evidence? Under what circumstances should the court instruct
the jury that certain evidence or testimony was proper only to show
the credibility of the witness and may not be regarded as evidence
on the merits?
The one circumstance in which an instruction of the sort men-
tioned is proper is where the evidence is a prior inconsistent state-
ment of a non-party witness. Of course if the Uniform Rules are
adopted, such a statement will be admissible as positive evidence and
such an instruction would no longer be used.80
My answer to the first part of the question would be "No."
Though there is a vast distinction in theory between impeachment
and positive evidence, there is none in practice. Professor McCor-
82. Johnson v. Baltimore & 0 R. R., 208 F. 2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953).
83. See DeParcq, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View,
40 Minn. L. Rev. 301, 316-19 (1956).
84. Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N. W. 58 (1893).
85. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 20.
86. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1).
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mick says that instructions telling the jury particular evidence was
admitted only for impeachment are
"a mere verbal ritual. The distinction is not one that most
jurors would understand. If they could understand it, it seems
doubtful that they would attempt to follow it. Trial judges
- seem to consider the instruction a futile gesture."8 7
And he describes the distinction as demanding a "finical neutrality
alien to the atmosphere of jury trial" and as "arbitrary and indis-
criminate."18  Most experienced lawyers would agree.89
26. Is a question which calls for the conclusion of a witness
proper on cross-examination?
Such a question is proper. It is also extremely dangerous.
Where the witness is hostile, as he will normally be under cross-
examination, he is likely to draw inferences and reach conclusions
which will not be helpful to the cross-examiner.
VI. EXPERT USE OF EXPERT TEsTIMONY
27. A standard objection to a question calling for the conclu-
sion of an expert witness is that it "uisrps the fiction of the jury."
When is this objection valid?
This famous old objection does not amount to much anymore.
Wigmore dismissed it as "empty rhetoric. '90 In a thorough con-
sideration of the question, the Minnesota Supreme Court has said
unequivocally:
"Experts are permitted to give their opinions upon the very
issue which the jury will have to decide, but such opinions are
not conclusive."91
A somewhat different rule prevails in federal court, where the ex-
pert opinion is not allowed if it goes to the ultimate issue of the
whole case, rather than merely a part of the case.
2
The valid objection, often confused with the objection set out
in the question, is that the question put to the expert involves a
matter which the jury can decide fully as well as could an expert,
and thus there is no need for opinion testimony. 3
87. McCormick, Evidence 77 (1954).
88. Id. at 78.
89. DeParcq, The Uniform Rules of Evidencc: A Plaintiff' View, 40
_,Minn L. Rev. 301, 341 (1956).
90. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1920 (3d ed. 1940). And see McCormick,
Evidence § 12 (1954).
91. Berg v. Ullevig, 244 Minn. 390, 395-6, 70 N. V. 2d 133, 139, noted
39 Marq. L. Rev. 173 (1955) ; Piche v. Halvorson, 199 Minn. 526, 530, 272
N. W. 591, 593 (1937).
92. Compare United States v. Spaulding, 293 U. S. 498 (1935), twith
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 85 F. 2d 162 (8th Cir. 1936).
93. Compare Beckman v. Schroeder, 224 Minn. 370, 28 N. AV. 2d 629
(1947), with Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Mim. 213, 54 N. NV. 2d 649 (1952).
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28. Plaintiff's doctors all testify that she has been injured by
applications of a certain liniment. The evidence in the record, not
contradicted, is that plaintiff never used any liniment before. May
defendant ask plaintiff's doctors a hypothetical question which re-
quires them to assume that plaintiff used the liniment five times pre-
viously without injury, and asks whether, on these facts, they would
conclude that the liniment caused the injury?
It would have seemed that the answer to this question would be
governed by the principle laid down by Wigmore that
"it is obvious that the question must not include data which
there is not a fair possibility of the jury accepting." 9'
Such a rule has been applied in Minnesota.95 And I think it is fair
to say that the consensus of the panel was that the question de-
scribed would be improper.
The supreme court, in a case which was under advisement at
the time of the Institute, decided to the contrary 0 It held the case
governed by an exception to the stated rule which allows questions
on cross-examination of an expert which, for the purpose of testing
his skill and accuracy, assume facts having no foundation in the
evidence.9 7
29. What are the limitations on the use of medical texts in cross-
examining expert witnesses?
Medical treatises are not admissible as substantive evidence be-
cause the authors are not under oath nor subject to cross-examina-
tion,9 although this rule would be changed by a controversial provi-
sion of the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence.?9 Under existing
law, however, there are circumstances in which treatises can be
used to test the qualifications and credibility of an expert witness.
If the expert has assumed to base his opinion upon a particular
medical book, he may be cross-examined with reference to it, and
parts of the book which contradict him may be read into the
record.100 If he says generally that the authorities support his view,
he may be questioned, on cross-examination, as to whether a medi-
94. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 682 (3d ed. 1940).
95. State v. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430, 433 (1886); Kenney v. Chicago
G. W. Ry., 71 N. W. 2d 669, 672 (Minn. 1955).
96. Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 70 N. W. 2d 261, 265 (Minn.
1955). The present writer was of counsel to the unsuccessful plaintiff.
97. Williams v. Great Northern Ry., 68 Minn. 55, 65, 70 N. W. 860,
864 (1897) ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 684 (3d ed. 1940).
98. Ruud v. Hendrickson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N. W. 904 (1929).
99. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(31). Compare Dana, Admis-
sion of Learned Treatises in Evidence, [1945] Wis. L. Rev. 455, with Grubb,
Proposed "Learned Treatises" Rule, [1946] Wis. L. Rev. 81.
100. See Briggs v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 238 Minn. 472, 494, 57 N. W.
2d 572, 583 (1953).
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cal work, admitted by him to be a standard authority, does not
express a contrary view.1 0' Passages from a work he concedes to
be authoritative may be read by the cross-examiner, not as evidence
of their truth but solely to discredit the.expert10 2 Probably such
questions may be asked about works admittedly authoritative even
thougfi the expert, on direct examination, did not purport to rely
on the authorities
3
But the expert may not be cross-examined about treatises he
does-not accept as authoritative, nor may the views expressed in
such treatises be indicated.'" And it has even been held to be re-
versible error to permit cross-examination about a book which the
witness "reluctantly" accepts as reasonably authoritative.105
30. Minnesota Rule 35.01 allows blood tests as a form of dis-
covery in a paternity action. To whzat extent are the residis of such
tests adndssible? I
There is no Minnesota decision in point, and answer to this
question is necessarily a surmise based on what other courts have
done.106 Even this is somewhat unsatisfactory for many aspects of
this matter are still the subject of dispute among the courts. It is
assumed here that the Minnesota court, which has made something
of a reputation for itself by its scholarly interest in problems of
evidence, will look to the latest and best decisions elsewhere as a
guide.
Blood tests can never prove that a particular person is the
father of the child. They can, however, positively exclude the possi-
bility of paternity. In the present state of the science, an alleged
father wrongly accused should be able to demonstrate his innocence
by blood tests in about 55% of the cases.107 Assuming an adequate
foundation of expert testimony, vouching for the reliability of the
technique and the correctness of its application in the particular
case, expert testimony that the accused person is not the father of
the child would now be generally received. 08 Indeed most courts
101. Landro v. Great Northern Ry., 117 Minn. 306, 309, 135 N. W.
991, 992 (1912) ; cf. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U. S. 269 (1949).
102. B6wles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S. W. 2d 779 (1949).
103. Though the question is technically left open, the court seems to
hint this is Briggs v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 238 Minn. 472, 491-92, 57 N. W.
2d 572, 582 (1953). This is the sounder rule. McCormick, Evidence 6-20
n. 3 (1954).
104. Briggs v. Chicago G. W. Ry., supra note 103.
105. Zubryski v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 68 N. W. 2d 489 (Minn. 1955),
39 Minn. L. Rev. 905.
106. There is a splendid discussion in McCormick, Evidence § 178(1954), and an exhaustive annotation at 163 A. L. R. 939 (1946).
107. Keeffe and Bailey, "A Trial of Bastardy Is a Trial of the Blood,"
34 Corn. L. Q. 72, 75 (1948).
108. McCormick, Evidence 381 (1954).
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would allow it even to rebut the presumption of legitimacy where a
husband wishes to show he is not the father. 00 .
Courts today do not allow the evidence where it shows that the
accused person could have been the father of the child.110 Recogniz-
ing that such evidence is not conclusive, scholars have nevertheless
argued that the possibility of paternity is relevant along with other
-identifying traits, and have urged that courts should have discretion
to admit such evidence where they believe its relevance outweighs
its possible prejudicial effect."' These arguments seem persuasive.
Where the experts are agreed that the blood tests show the
accused person could not have been the father, the popular view
today is that this testimony should be given conclusive effect, and
jury verdicts to the contrary set aside. 11 2 Surely this is right if the
purpose of the trial is to determine the fact question of whether
accused fathered the child. I submit that is not the purpose of the
trial; it is rather to determine whether the person named should
provide financial support for the child. And I think an important
truth is hidden in McCormick's happily phrased description of one
case where eleven sets of blood tests proved defendant could not be
the father, and where:
"The jury, as usual, found the defendant was the father, prob-
ably on the doctrine of assumption of risk.""M
I think we have here one of those many areas where juries use their
common sense to create a different rule of law than that announced
by the courts. The courts say defendant must pay if he is the father:
juries say defendant must pay if he had access at the proper season
and thus could, but for the whims of chance, have been the father.
The conflict between these rules should not be resolved by pretend-
ing it is a question of evidence, or by increasing the denigration of
the jury and the glorification of appellate courts.
31. In a FELA case the employee's widow testifies that he was
making, after taxes, $425 a month, that he always turned over his
full pay check to his wife, and that she gave him $50 a month for his
own expenses and used the rest for the family. Plaintiff calls an
actuary and asks the actuary the present value of $375 a month for
the employee's life expectancy. Is this question properf
109. E.g., Cortese v. Cortese 10 N. J. Super. 152, 76 A. 2d 717 (1950).
110. E.g., State v. Morris, 16 Ohio St. 333, 102 N. E. 2d 450 (1951).
111. McCormick, Evidence 382-83 (1954) ; Comment, 33 U. of Det. L. J.
214 (1956). See Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity § 4.
112. E.g., Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949) ; C. v. C.,
200 Misc. 631, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 276 (1951) ; McCormick, Evidence 381-82(1954) ; Note, 38 Corn. L. Q. 75 (1952). Contra: e.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74
Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946).
113. McCormick, Evidence 382 (1954).
[Vol. 40:635
A PRIMER OF PRACTICAL EVIDENCE
The measure of damages in an FELA death action is the present
value of decedent's expected contribution to his family. The ques-
lion here is whether the actuarial testimony would be useful to the
jury in determining those damages. The Seventh Circuit seems to
have held, in a remarkably unclear and cantankerous opinion, that
it is error to permit actuarial testimony based on a measure of
damages which the jury would not be free to adopt.1" 4 In the case
referred to the improper actuarial evidence related to decedent's
gross earnings rather than to his. contributions.
On the facts presented, decision would turn on whether $375
a month can be regarded as decedent's contributions to his family.
or whether part of that $375 goes for his own food, housing, etc.,
and thus cannot be taken into account. I think the testimony
proper.115 My analysis would be that plaintiff has made a prima
facie showing of contributions in the amount of $375 a month, and
that an actuary can testify as to the present worth of this sum for
the husband's life expectancy. Defendant is then free by evidence or
argument to seek to persuade the jury that the contributions were
some sum less than this. This argument turns on the settled prin-
ciple that actuarial testimony may be admitted, if on the proper
theory, even though the figure used by the actuary in his computa-
tions was one which the jury might not accept.1 6
32. Is it proper, in an injury case, to ask the jury to deternin
how miuch per day is a reasonable award for pain and suffering, and
have an actuary testify as to the present value of this daily son for
plaintiff's life expectaiwy?
The answer seemingly must be "No," although the decisions are
not entirely clearcut. Actually the testimony seems quite unneces-
sary, for in most jurisdictions it is held that damages for pain ard
suffering need not be reduced to present worth.' 7 The more inter-
esting underlying question goes to the permissibility of the currently
popular technique of asking for damages for such elements as pain
and suffering on a daily basis. The court has expressed itself, some-
114. Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 191 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951).
115. See DeParcq and Wright Damages Under The Federal Employer's
Liability Act,-Ohio St L. J.-(Summer 1956). C.f. Starck v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry., 4 Ill. 2d 611, 623-24, 123 N. E. 2d 826, 833 (1954).
116. Southern Pacific Co. v. Klinge, 65 F. 2d 85 (loth Cir. 1933). But
cf. Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 133 N. E. 2d 288 (I11. 1956), in which
the present writer was of counsel to the successful plaintiff.
117. McCormick, Damages 318 (1935); Annos., 28 A. L. IL 1177, 77
A. L. R. 1439, 1451-53; see Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St P. & S. S. M. R. L,
244 Minn. 1, 30, 68 N. -W. 2d 873, 891 (1955).
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what unclearly, on this question in two decisions announced a week
apart.
In the Ahistrom case the court held damages of $275,000 exces-
sive, and ordered a remittitur the amount above $175,000.11" Ii
the course of the decision the court said:
"An award for pain, suffering, and disability on a per diem ba.sis
ignores the subjective basis of such damages .... Each day of
suffering is a part of a whole and will vary and generally de-
crease as time goes on. To permit a per diem evaluation of pain,
suffering, and disability would plunge the already subjective
determination into absurdity by demanding accurate mathemati-
cal computation of the present worth of an amount reached by
guesswork."
A week later, in the Hallada case," 9 the court cut a verdict from
$170,154.81 to $105,000. This time it took a more temperate view
of the process of calculation here under consideration.
"The segmentation process of breaking the damage picture into
fragments and then applying to each fragment a mathematical
formula whereby damages are calculated at a fixed rate per day
for the entire period of the injured person's life expectancy,
though illuminating, may be misleading.... [P]ain and suffer-
ing which is subjective and which at its very worst usually
varies from day to day cannot, with any finality, be estimated
on a daily basis .... Whatever process is adopted in fixing an
injured person's damages, the reasonableness of the lump sum
awarded by the jury must, in the last analysis, also be tested
from the unitary standpoint of what total financial benefits that
lump sum will confer upon the injured person as a means of
making him financially whole. No award can be sustained unless
it stands the test of reasonableness in the light of its over-all
effect."12
0
Since the holdings of the court in the cases discussed are merely
that the verdict in each case is excessive, we have no sure guide for
the future, and must try and devise a rule by the hints in the dicta.
My guess is that actuaries will not be permitted to testify as to the
present worth of a daily sum for pain and suffering, and that the
supreme court will hold such rulings a proper exercise of the
trial court's power to exclude testimony where its confusing effect
exceeds its probative value. 2' Plaintiff's counsel will be permitted to
118. Ibid.
119. Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N. W. 2d 673(1955). See also Becksted v. Skelly Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mim.
1955).
120. Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 119 at 98. 99. 69 N. W.
2d at 687.
121. Compare Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45.
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argue to the jury in terms of a daily sum.'2 2 But where this method
of argument is used, the supreme court will scrutinize the verdict
with care, and will order a remittitur if it finds the verdict too liberal.
VII. TE STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO EvIDENXCE AND
How To MEET TEEM
33. The words "irrelevant, incompetent, and intmaterial" conie
off my tongue quite easily. When do I use them properly?
In theory evidence is "material" if it is within the issues raised
in the case, while it is "relevant" if it tends to establish the proposi-
tion for which it is offered. But this distinction is rarely observed
in practice and the terms are frequently used interchangeably. 2 -
Indeed even the additional term, "incompetent," is probably idio-
matic, with the entire phrase meaning, as Judge Loevinger believes.
"irrelevant,"'2 4 although strictly speaking "competency" refers to
whether evidence falls within one of the exclusionary rules.
The stock objection set out here should be used only where the
evidence is dearly inadmissible on grounds of relevancy, and even
then the addition of two more words to the objection probably adds
little to clarity of thought. The court has held repeatedly that this
standard objection does not suffice as an attack on evidence which
is hearsay or for some other reason subject to exclusion.'2 5 Prob-
ably the best advice is to avoid use of this cliche, and state instead
the specific ground of objection.
34. When an objection is inade to a hypothetical question on the
ground that it fails to include all pertinent evidence, should the judge
ask the objector what omissions he has in mind? Is it proper for the
objector to refuse to mpply the information?
The principles applicable to this question have recently been
restated by the'court.?-2 The objecting lawyer is required to specify
the grounds of his objection to a hypothetical question, not only to
enable the court to rule intelligently thereon but also to afford
opposing counsel an opportunity to amend and overcome the defect
in his question if possible. If the lawyer asking the question is in
122. Cf. J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S. W. 2d 786
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
123. McCormick, Evidence 315 (1954).
124. Loevinger, The Minnesota Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
III(C) (4) (1949), reprinted in the pocket part to 38 finn. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1955).
125. State v. Rosenweig, 168 Miinn. 459, 210 N. W. 403 (1926)"
Pleason Realty & Inv. Co. v. Kleinman, 165 finn. 342. 206 N. W. 645(1925) ; State v. Pearson, 153 Minn. 32, 189 N. AV. 404 (1922).
126. Adelmann v. Elk River Lumber Co., 242 finn. 388. 393, 65 N. W.
2d 661, 665-67 (1954).
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doubt as to what was wrong with it, he has the right to ask the
court and it is the court's duty to answer the inquiry, though this
of course does not mean that the judge must frame the question for
the lawyer.
12 7
35. In a suit against the owner of a building for permitting a
dangerous condition to exist which reslted in personal injuries, is it
competent evidence that, prior to the accident, the owner's liability
insurer told him the condition was dangerous?
Remedial measures taken after the accident are, of course, in-
admissible by a well-settled rule.1 28 But this is quite different from
knowledge of the dangerous condition before the accident. An ele-
ment for recovery against the owner or possessor of land is that he
knows the condition involves an unreasonable risk, and where a
licensee is suing, it is also necessary to show that the owner knew of
the existence of the condition.129 A statement by some third person
to the owner prior to the accident has a direct bearing in showing
realization of the risk, and is admissible for that purpose. 3 0 Nor is
the evidence made inadmissible because it incidentally reveals that
defendant is insured. Evidence of insurance is not relevant to show
negligence but otherwise proper evidence is still proper though it
discloses the presence of insurance,'"' subject to the power of the
court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence where its prejudicial
effect exceeds its probative value.' 8 2 Where the evidence is as direct-
ly useful as in the present question, it is hardly likely that that power
should be exercised.
36. How much previous observation is necessary as a foundation
to expressing an opinion as to the speed of a moving automobile?
To make a witness competent to give such evidence no expert
training is required. Any person of ordinary intelligence who can
say that he is able to form an estimate as to the speed of the
automobile, and that he saw it in motion, so that he had reasonable
opportunity to observe its speed, can give such an opinion." The
court has held, however, that where on his own testimony the wit-
127. State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 339, 112 N. W. 409, 412 (1907).
128. Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 16 N. W. 358
(1883) ; Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 51; McCormick, Evidence § 77
(1954).
129. Restatement, Torts §§ 342(a), 343(a) (1939).
130. Cf. Malmquist v. Leeds, 71 N. W. 2d 863, 868 (Minn. 1955). in
which the present writer was of counsel for the successful plaintiff.
131. McCormick, Evidence § 168 (1954).
132. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45; State v. Haney. 219 ,Mitr.
518, 520, 18 N. W. 2d 315, 316 (1945).
133. See Beecroft v. Great Northern Ry., 134 Minn. 86, 87 (1916), aff'd
without opinion, 242 U. S. 618 (1916).
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ness did not see the vehicle until it was upon him, he had no such
reasonable opportunity, and should not have been allowed to esti-
mate the speed. 3 But this rule is being relaxed. Other jurisdictions
have allowed expression of an opinion as to speed where the witness
had only a momentary glimpse of the vehicle, and even where he
never saw it but merely heard it. 35 Our court has allowed an esti-
mate of speed by one who never saw the vehicle, but merely relied
on scientific data and on what others had told him,9 0 and has dis-
cussed with apparent approval a case from another state holding
that even a non-expert who had not seen the car in motion could
give an opinion as to the car's speed based on an examination of its
skid marks. 37
37. Can radar evidence be used to show that a driver was speed-
ing. What kind of foundation would be required?
Although there has been confusion and uncertainty among
inferior courts, 38 many of the questions involving use of radar are
likely to be resolved along the lines suggested by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the first decision on this subject by a court of last
resort. 39 That court, after a very careful review of the authorities,
lent its great prestige to a determination that the reliability of radar
devices for telling the speed of a moving vehicle is sufficiently be-
yond question 4 ° that courts should take judicial notice of this
fact.' 41
If, as seems likely, the Minnesota Court follows this New Jersey
decision, it will be necessary to show only that the radar device was
properly set up and tested by the police officers, and was functioning
properly at the particular time in question ;142 it will not be necessary
to introduce independent expert testimony by electrical engineers
as to its general nature and trustworthiness.
The usual method of testing the radar instrument is to set it up
'in the position where it is to be used. One police officer then drives
134. Ibid.
135. Anno., 156 A. L. R. 382 (1945).
136. Moeller v. St. Paul City Ry., 218 Minn. 353, 16 N. AV. 2d 289(1944).
137. Id. at 363-64, 16 N. W. 2d 295-96, discussing Heidner v. Germ-
schied, 41 S. D. 430, 171 N. W. 208 (1919).
138. For a definitive discussion of the early cases, see Baer, Radar
Goes to Court, 33 N. C. L. Rev. 355 (1955).
139. State v. Dantonio, 18 N. J. 570, 115 A. 2d 35 (1955).
140. Kopper, The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters 33
N. C. L. Rev. 343 (1955).
141. This is in accord with the urgings of scholars. Baer, supra note
138, at 380-81; Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 Va. L. Rev. 808, 813-14(1954). Contra: People v. Beck, 205 Misc. 757, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (1954).
142. Cf. State v. Moffitt 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. 1953).
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through the beam and calls over his radio the speed shown on his
speedometer; another officer, in the car with the radar, calls back
over his radio the speed indicated by the radar. If these coincide, the
device is assumed to be operating properly. One court has refused to
allow evidence of such a test, on the ground that the officer's
testimony as to what he heard over the radio is hearsay. 14 This
conclusion seems very doubtful. Each officer has firsthand knowl-
edge that his mechanism showed the same speed as was called by
the other. He is testifying, then, as to the fact of utterance of one
meter reading and the actual reading of the other meter. The test-
ing was a joint undertaking, and all the parties thereto can be
present in court, put under oath, and thoroughly examined. It should
be held that the hearsay rule does not apply.' 4'
38. What sort of showing must be made before the results of a
drunkometer test can be admitted in ev4dence?
A 1955 statute provides that the court "may" admit evidence of
the amount of alcohol in a driver's blood taken voluntarily within
two hours of his arrest as shown by a medical or chemical analysis
of his breath, blood, urine or saliva. 45 The statute provides that such
evidence shall not be conclusive. 140
It should be noted that this statute makes admission of the test
results discretionary with the court. Such tests vary widely in their
reliability. Thus the simple and popular breath test is much more
likely to yield an erroneous result than is a blood test.147 Differences
among the experts as to the reliability of any scientific technique
should go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissi-
bility.148 At the same time the trial judge should not hesitate to ex-
clude the evidence if in the particular case its probative value is
143. People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 179 (1953). Pro-
fessor Baer apparently agrees, though he suggests another means to bring
such tests into evidence without offending the hearsay rule. Baer, supra
note 138, at 372.
144. Woodbridge, supra note 141, at 815; cf. State v. Dantonio, 18 N. J.
570, 115 A. 2d 35 (1955). In State v. Ryan, 293 P. 2d 399 (Wash. 1956),
such a test was held unnecessary by a divided court.
145. Minn. L. 1955, c. 487; Minn. Stat. § 169.12(2) (Supp. 1955).
146. The following able criticisms of these tests are useful preparation
for cross-examination of the prosecution's expert. Gardner, Breath Tests for
Alcohol, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 289 (1953) ; Rabinowitch, Medico-Legal Aspects of
Chemical Tests, 39 J. Crim. L. 225 (1948). Refusal of the driver to submit
to such a test should not be admissible. State v. Severson, 75 N. W. 2d 316
(N.D. 1956).
147. McCormick, Evidence 376-77 (1954) ; People v. Morse, 325 Mich.
270, 38 N. W. 2d 322 (1948).
148. McCormick, Evidence § 170 (1954). For a contrary view, see
29 Temp. L. Q. 210 (1956).
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outweighed by the possibility the jury may be misled or unduly
prejudiced. 49
The Minnesota statute does not provide that the court may take
judicial notice of the reliability of tests for drunkenness, and
scientific opinion is sufficiently divided about such tests that a
court would hardly wish to take judicial notice on its own. Thus
in the-present state of the science the proponent of such evidence
should show the underlying theory and operation of the test used,
the accuracy of the method in general and the machine in particular,
administration of the test of the particular defendant by qualified
persons, and the medical interpretation of the results.1"0
VIII. lImING THE TRUTH BEHIND A PRIVILEGE
39. What practical effect is there to the statute which makes
highway accident reports of police officers confidential? Can the
police officer be called and required to testify as to statements made
to him at the time of the accident. Can he ue the report to refresh
his recollkction?
The statute' 5 ' provides that no accident report shall be used as
evidence in any trial, but a 1947 amendment adds that this does not
bar a person who has made such a report from testifying "as to facts
within his knowledge." The amendment has been said to have over-
ruled earlier decisions, and to permit the officer to refer to his re-
port to refresh his recollection as to facts which he gathered during
his investigation of the accident.1 12 In a controversial reading of the
statute, the court has said that things told to the officer by the
parties to the accident are "facts within his knowledge" and that he
may testify as to these admissions. 53
40. Does the last sentence of Ride 26.02, which nakes the work
product of an attorney immune from discovery, affect the ad-
inissibility of evidence at the trial?
The rules specifically provide that information may be obtained
by discovery though it would be inadmissible at the trial.' And
149. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45; McCormick, Evidence 377
(1954).
150. E.g., People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. 2d 567 (1951);
People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 492 (1954) ; Hill ,. State,
256 S. W. 2d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953); Donigan, Chemical Test Case
Law 71-80 (1950); Conrad, Push Button Evidence, 41 Va. L. Rev. 217,
225-28 (1955).
151. Minn. Stat. § 169.09(13) (1953).
152. See Garey v. Michelsen, 227 Minn. 468, 475, 35 N. W. 2d 750, 775(1949).
153. Rockwood v. Pierce, 235 Minn. 519, 51 N. W. 2d 670 (1952),
criticized 36 Minn. L. Rev. 540.
154. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02; Wright's Minnesota Rules 156-57 (1954).
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absent a specific rule creating immunity from discovery, anything
which is admissible in evidence at the trial is, ipso facto, subject
to discovery.1' 5 The question is whether the converse of this is true,
whether a rule creating immunity from discovery creates an im-
munity also from use at the trial.
Though there is no clear authority, on principle the answer
should be "No." The work product concept of Rule 26.02 goes
beyond the attorney-client privilege as that has been understood. 150
It does not by its terms relate to admissibility in evidence. The
rule on that latter subject provides that evidence shall be admitted
which is admissible "under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the trials of actions in the courts of this state."' Again different
rules govern subpoena for taking depositions and subpoena for
hearing or trial. 58 The first is specifically limited by the scope of ex-
amination permitted in Rule 26.02; the latter is not so limited. With
the rules in this posture, the fair conclusion is that Rule 26.02 was
not intended to change the rules of evidence at the trial, and a
party may compel production at the trial, by a subpoena duces
tecum, of documents which are immune from discovery. Though
the court does not discuss this particular problem, the leading case
of Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.'55 supports these conclusions by
discussing quite independently, and in terms of different criteria.
the questions of whether the document there in question is subject to
discovery and whether it is admissible at the trial.
41. I represent the plaintiff in a negligence case in which the
defendant impleaded his insurance company, which had refused to
defend him. An agent of the insurer, while he was on the stand.
made reference to the file on the insurer's investigation. .'lni I
entitled to see that file?
It was pointed out earlier that the adverse party has a right to
inspect any document consulted by a witness on the stand.' Thus
if the agent actually looked at the file while on the stand, defendant,
who is surely adverse to the company, has a right to inspect the
file. On the better view, plaintiff and third-party defendant are ad-
155. "It seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should
provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case." Jackson, J.,
concurring in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 515 (1947).
156. Hickman v. Taylor, supra note 155; Brown v. St. Patil City Ry..
241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688 (1954).
157. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.01; Wright's Minnesota Rules 260 (1954).
158. Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.04, 45.05.
159. 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688 (1954).
160. P. 650 supra.
Vol. 40:635
A PRIMER OF PRACTICAL EVIDENCE
verse parties,' 61 and plaintiff in the situation here described would
have a similar right to look at the document. If the agent merely
mentions that the company has a file but does not actually consult
it, neither plaintiff nor defendant has any right to inspect it.
42. Can defendant use a statement which he has taken from an
injured person if he has nwt provided the injured person with a
copy?
The statement of an injured person may not be used in evidence
unless a copy is given the injured person within 30 days after the
statement was mtde; if the statement was taken within 30 days
of the accident, it is presumably fraudulent. 0 2 If a statement falls
within the statute it may not be used to impeach the plaintiff. Every-
one agreed that the statute barred use of the typical longhand state-
ment signed by the plaintiff, but some defendants' lawyers con-
tended that the statute did not reach situations where a court re-
porter had taken a verbatim account of the conversation between
the injured person and an investigator for defendant, and the
reporter then used the transcript to refresh her recollection as to
what was said in that conversation. The court has rejected this con-
tention, and held that the statute, intended to prevent unfair prac-
tices in the procurement of statements from injured parties, should
be construed liberally:
"It does not specify that such statements be signed, and it would
seem that if the obvious purpose of this statute is to be fulfilled
any writtdn statement or memorandum taken under the cir-
cumstances described, whether in shorthand, longhand, or typed,
or any statement recorded by tape, wire, or otherwise would be
encompassed within its terms. The rejection of a transcription
of shorthand notes of such a statement would afford no statutory
protection if the contents thereof are nevertheless received by the
simple device of having the witness refresh her memory from the
shorthand notes and thereafter relate plaintiff's responses as
contained therein."' 6 3
43. Does the doctor-patientprivilege provide an opportunity for
working a fraud onthe court and jury?
Probably most professional opinion is that it does. The panel
at our Institute expressed such a view, and abolition of the privi-
lege has been a popular goal of reform groups. Scholars are seem-
161. Wright's Minnesota Rules 89-91 (1954).
162. Minn. Stat. § 602.01 (1953). Such statements are imune front
discovery. Wright's Minnesota Rules 168-69 (1954).
163. Prince v. Grieger, 244 Minn. 466, 470-71 70 N. W. 2d 421, 424(1955).
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ingly as one in their criticism of the privilege.10 ' The measured
conclusion of a fair-minded critic is that:
"More than a century of experience with the statutes has demon-
strated that the privilege in the main operates not as the shield of
privacy but as the protector of fraud. Consequently the abandon-
ment of the privilege seems the best solution."1065
These critics have in mind that the privilege enables a patient
to tell a story of his injuries without fear of contradiction from a
physician who knows this story to be untrue. And it may even
permit an injured person to consult several physicians independently
and put on the stand only that doctor whose testimony will be favor-
able, claiming the privilege as to other doctors.100
Without wishing to dissent from an opinion so widely held, I
should like to express a faint doubt as to its implications. Many of
the abuses which the privilege permits elsewhere are not possible
in Minnesota. An old and familiar practice permits the defendant
to make his own physical examination.'0 7 By requesting and obtain-
ing a copy of the report of this examination, plaintiff waives his
privilege with regard to any other person who has examined him
with respect to the same physical condition.108 These procedures
surely minimize, at least, the possibility of fraud.
Further, the absolute nature of other privileges can hardly
survive critical analysis; the desirable solution, for the physician-
patient privilege and for others, seems to me to be to give the trial
court discretion to compel disclosure where the interests of justice
so require.16 9 Piecemeal reform in procedure is a dangerous thing,
which often saps the reform movement and prevents the sweeping
reforms which are necessary. Thus I should oppose abolition of the
physician-patient privilege, in the hope that dissatisfaction with
that privilege could be channeled in support of the broader proposals
outlined above.
164. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380(a) (3d ed. 1940); Note, 12 Minn.
L. Rev. 390 (1928) ; and other writings cited at McCormick, Evidence 220
n. 1 (1954).
165. Id. at 224.
166. Id. at 219. If the doctors are consulted jointly, putting one of them
on the stand waives the privilege as to the other. Doll v. Scandrett, 201 Minn.
316, 276 N. W. 281 (1937), 22 Minn. L. Rev. 580 (1938).
167. Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01.
168. Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.02(2); Wright's Minnesota Rules 217-18
(1954), quoting a fine opinion by Judge Flinn in the 13th District on the
extent of the waiver.
169. Such a proposal is persuasively presented at McCormick, Evi-
dence § 81 (1954).
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IX. LAWYE MANSHIP
44. Is it ever proper to argue offers and objections to evidence
in the hearing of the jury?
Judge Loevinger, during his many years on the trial bench,
strenuously objected to lawyers arguing offers of proof or objections
in the hearing of the jury. He reasoned that if the objection is
argued then the jury will be hearing a discussion which very often
goes to the merits. Further the argument of an offer of proof win
disclose the evidence as it is offered and the purpose of making the
objection may be lost. The one exception which Judge Loevinger
would allow is where the lawyer has asked an improper question of
the sort where the question itself is the offense and not the answer.
In such a circumstance the damage has been done by asking the
question and the objector may be allowed to argue his objection
in the hearing of the jury in order to offset that damage by his
argument.
45. What preventive tactics are available to prevent the asking
of a question, which I can certainly object to, but which I don't
want the jury even to hear being asked?
The difficult task is to anticipate the improper question which
may be asked. If this can be done, it would then be proper to go to
the judg6 in chambers -with opposing counsel of course present
- and ask for a ruling 'in advance. If the court is reluctant to
rule on an objection not yet made to a question not yet asked, he
may well order the opposing attorney, if he should decide to offer
such evidence, to do so first out of the hearing of the jury. Even
if the motion is denied in situations like this, it will at least serve
the purpose of advance notice to the court and the opposing attorney
of the objector's feeling that the matter is so prejudicial that the
mere asking of a question about it will cause irreparable harm. This
will be of value on appeal to meet the claim that injection of the
improper question was inadvertent or harmless error. 10
46. What steps should be taken to protect the record for appeal?
The rules no longer require exceptions to rulings of the court."I'
Fundamentally what is required is to have the record show clearly
the grounds of objections and of rulings. 72 This means that the
objector should state specifically the basis for his objection." 3 If an
170. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods 192-93 (1954).
171. Minn. R. Civ. P. 46.
172. Wright's Minnesota Rules 272-73 (1954).
173. See p. 657 above.
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objection is sustained, the party who asked the question should re-
quest the court, if necessary, to specify the ground on which he sus-
tained the objection.17' An offer of proof should always be made
when an objection has been sustained. In a jury action the court
will usually require the offer to be made out of the hearing of the
jury; in a non-jury action the court is normally expected to take
and report the evidence to which it has sustained the objection. 175
An error in instructions must be objected to before the jury retires
unless the error goes to fundamental law or controlling principle,170
and even then may not be considered on appeal if it is not raised in
the motion for new trial. 77 Other devices for protecting the record
are set out in Judge Loevinger's monograph.1 7 8
X. JUSTICE TRIUMPHS-THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
47. In a recent case my opponent objected to a certain document
I wished to introduce as "immaterial." The judge said, "Well, it's
certainly material. The proper objection is that no foundation has
been laid." My opponent, of course, hasily said, " I meant to include
want of foundation as part of my objection." The court then sus-
tained the objection. Was this proper? If the other side doesn't
know what objection to make, why should the court help them out?
Where a lawyer by reason of inexperience or timidity in court is
unable to think of the proper objection, there is no reason why the
judge should not help him so long as in doing so he does not give
the jury the idea he favors one side or the other. Thus Judge
Loevinger told the Institute:
"I have frequently said in overruling a question, 'THAT objec-
tion is overruled,' assuming that counsel would be alert and
realize that he has made the wrong objection and proceed to
make the right one. I have been disappointed many times."
At the same time, our rules of evidence are at least in part the
product of the adversary system, and thus with experienced attor-
neys a judge would hardly wish to be astute and to suggest to one
side or the other objections which have not occurred to them.
48. To what extent may the judge call witnesses of his own, or
examine witnesses called by the parties?
The usual view is that the judge may properly do both of the
174. Adelman v. Elk River Lumber Co., 65 N. W. 2d 661 (Minn. 1954).
175. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.03; Wright's Minnesota Rules 262 (1954).
176. Minn. R. Civ. P. 51; Wright's Minnesota Rules 291-92 (1954).
177. Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 66 N. W. 2d 892 (Minn. 1954).
178. Loevinger, The Minnesota Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1949),
reprinted in the pocket part to 38 Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955).
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things specified in the question 79 As Chief Judge Charles E. Clark
puts it, the trial judge
"enjoys the prerogative, rising often to the standard of a duty,
of eliciting those facts he deems necessary to the clear presenta-
tion of the issues."'' 0
There seem to be no Minnesota decisions on the power of the
judge to call his own witnesses; the court has upheld the right of
the judge to examine witnesses called by the parties, both in
civil"8 ' and in criminal8 2 cases. Because of our tradition that the
judge may ndt comment on the evidence, care must be taken that
the questions are fair, show no bias, do not impress any view or
opinion of the court, and tend to clarify the record. Thus a con-
viction has been reversed where the trial judge asked questions of
an impeaching nature of defendant's witness.'8 And the supreme
court has said that usually any extensive questioning by the judge
should not take place until counsel have completed their examina-
tion. 84
49. Do the usual exclusionary rules of evidence apply in a case
tried to the court rather than to a jury?
Probably such rules as those of privilege do; but rules which
were spawned, in whole or in part, by the jury system, such as the
hearsay rule, the "best evidence" rule, the rule against opinions,
and the like, have no logical place in a court trial. Thus while the
rules retain a theoretical validity'85 in practice they are of little
effect. This result is partli dictated by the Rules of Civil Procedure
which call upon the judge to hear and report even evidence to which
he has sustained an objection except where privilege is claimed or
where "it dearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any
ground."1 86 Partly it is a combination of the tendency of trial judges
to "admit it for what it is worth" and of appellate courts to indulge
the gracious presumption that the trial judge relied only on the
179. 9 Wigimore, Evidence § 2484 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, Evidence§ 8 (1954) ; R. C., 13 Minn. L. Rev. 258 (1929), 15 Mi n. L. Rev. 350 (1931).
180. United States v. Brandt 196 F. 2d 653, 655 (2d Cir. 1952). See
Sink, Thi Unused Power of a Federal Judge To Call His Own Expert
Witness, 29 So. Cal. L. Rev. 195 (1956) ; Note, Trial Judge's Ditty to Call
Winess it; Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 58 Yale L. J., 183 (1948).
181. Taylor v. Taylor, 177 Minn. 428, 225 N. W. 287 (1929).
182. State v. Hansen,' 153 Minn. 339, 190 481 (1922).
183. State v. Sandquist, 146 Minn. 322, 178 N. W. 883 (1920); see
McCormick, Evidence 13 (1954).
184. See Taylor v. Taylor, 177 Minn. 428, 434, 225 N. WV. 287, 289-90(1929).
185. McCormick 137; Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 2.
186. M;nn R. Civ. P. 43.03.
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evidence which was properly admitted. 187 The attitude now govern-
ing has been strongly stated by Judge Sanborn:
"In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a
trial judge to committee reversible error by receiving incompe-
tent evidence, whether objected to or not. An appellate court
will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the
admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent
evidence is insufficient to support the judgment or unless it
affirmatively appears that the incompetent evidence induced the
court to make an essential finding which would not otherwise
have been made.... On the other hand, a trial judge who, in
the trial of a nonjury case, attempts to make strict rulings on
the admissibility of evidence, can easily get his decision reversed
by excluding evidence which is objected to but which, on re-
view ,the appellate court believes should have been admitted. 1 "'
50. What rules of evidence apply in proceedings before admin-
istrative agencies?
Section 7(c) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act " "
provides that "any oral or documentary evidence may be received;"
it goes on, however, to permit exclusion as a matter of policy of
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence, and requires
findings to be based on "reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence." This mandate, codifying earlier law, has led to great
liberality in the admission of evidence by administrative agencies:
evidence is admitted and relied on if it is practically helpful to
the commission in understanding the matter without regard to the
niceties of the rules of evidence.' 90 A famous statement of the
usual attitude is contained in an opinion by the Second Circuit
which, while technically a per curian, bears unmistakable marks
of having been written by Judge Learned Hand:
"Why either he or the Commission's attorney should have
thought it desirable to be so formal about the admission of evi-
dence, we cannot understand. Even in criminal trials to a jury
it is better, nine times out of ten, to admit, than to exclude.
evidence and in such proceedings as these the only conceivable
interest that can suffer by admitting any evidence is the time
lost, which is seldom as much as that inevitably lost by idle
bickering about irrelevancy or incompetence. In the case at bar it
chances that no injustice was done, but we take this occasion to
point out the danger always involved in conducting such a
187. McCormick, Evidence § 60 (1954) ; Davis, Administrative Law §
142 (1951).
188. Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F. 2d 377, 379 (8th Cir.
1950).
189. 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1006(c) (1952).
190. Davis, Administrative Law §§ 143-49 (1951).
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proceeding in such a spirit, and the absence of any advantage
in depriving either the Commission or ourselves of all evidence
which can conceivably throw any light upon the controversy."''I
The practice is not quite so liberal in proceedings before state
agencies. Although the statute regulating the particular proceeding
must be consulted, the typical rule, as contained variously in
statutes and decisions, is that which governs the Industrial Com-
mission in workmen's compensation proceedings. It is not bound
'by the common law or statutory rules of evidence, but "findings of
fact shall be based upon competent evidence only."'0°2 "Competent
evidence" apparently means evidence which would be admissible in
courts of law.193 Thus Minnesota preserves the discredited 9' rule
that there must be a "residuum" of legal evidence to support the
agency's decision.
It is possible that even privileges need not be recognized by
federal administrative agencies to the extent they are recognized in
court. 9 5 But Minnesota agencies seem bound by the statutory
privileges fully as much as are courts.1 09
191. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378,
380 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U. S. 734 (1945).
192. Mim. Stat. § 176.411(1) (1953). See Note, Evidence before
Administrative Tribunals in Minnesota, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 68 (1938).
193. See In. re Nash, 147 Minn. 383, 393, 181 N. W. 570, 574 (1920)(dissenting opinion).
194. See 1 Wigmore, Evidence 40-41 (3d ed. 1940) ; Davis,.Administra-
tive Law §§ 145, 149 (1951); Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the
State of New York 192 (1942) ; Davis, The Residum Rule in Adininistrative
Law, 28 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
195. Davis, Administrative Law 457 (1951).
196. Minn. Stat § 595.02 (1953).
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